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SUPPORTIVE YET SKEPTIC: KISOR V. WILKIE CASTS 
FURTHER DOUBT ON DEFERENCE DOCTRINE’S LONGEVITY 
MICHAEL SAMMARTINO* 
 
“The power of judicial review . . . lies with the courts because of 
a deep belief that the heritage they hold makes them experts in 
the synthesis of design.  Such difficulties as have arisen have 
come because courts cast aside that role to assume to themselves 
expertness in matters of industrial health, utility engineering, 
railroad management, even bread baking.  The rise of the 
administrative process represented the hope that policies to 
shape such fields could most adequately be developed by men 
bred to the facts.”1 
 
“We managed to live with the administrative state before 
Chevron.  We could do it again.  Put simply, it seems to me that 
in a world without Chevron very little would change—except 
perhaps the most important things.”2 
 
In Kisor v. Wilkie,3 the United States Supreme Court considered whether 
to retain its practice of deferring to an administrative agency’s interpretations 
of its own regulations.  Despite decades-long conservative criticism of Auer 
v. Robbins4 deference’s5 constitutionality and appropriateness, the Kisor 
Court voted to retain Auer’s deference doctrine.  While the Court’s decision 
reads as a fervent defense of administrative expertise, Kisor stops short of 
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1. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 154–55 (1938). 
2. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d. 1142, 1158 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
3. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
 4.  Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).  
5. Auer deference is a doctrine under which courts may grant deference to an executive 
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguity in its own regulations.  Id.; see infra Section II.D.2. 
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settling the question of whether the deference doctrine as a whole will 
ultimately survive the Roberts Court in a workable form.  Kisor’s framework 
indicates an underlying distrust of the administrative state and suggests a 
further retreat from the Court’s more deferential administrative 
jurisprudence.6 
Despite upholding Auer deference, Kisor’s implications suggest further 
erosion of the Court’s deference doctrine.  Part I will discuss Kisor’s 
procedural history.  Part II will trace the history of the Court’s deference 
doctrine and the diverging historic precedents of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council7 and Auer, with particular attention 
placed on the recent efforts to call deference doctrine into question.  Part III 
will review Justice Kagan’s majority opinion, which upholds Auer deference, 
and Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence, which argues for Auer’s complete 
abandonment.  Lastly, Part IV will argue that the Court’s decision realigns 
Auer deference with its historic precedent and redresses the constitutional 
issues on which Auer’s criticisms are based.8  Kisor’s framework, however, 
suggests how the Court may further narrow its deference doctrine, and, given 
the current ideological makeup of the Court, Kisor casts further doubt on 
deference doctrine’s longevity.9 
I.  THE CASE 
In 1982, petitioner Kisor applied for disability benefits from the 
Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”).10  He claimed that he had developed 
post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) due to his participation in combat 
operations during the Vietnam War.11  However, the VA Regional Office’s 
(“RO”) evaluating psychiatrist determined Kisor had a personality disorder, 
not PTSD, and denied Kisor his benefits.12 
On June 5, 2006, Kisor reopened his claim, requesting benefits 
extending back to the date of his 1982 application.13  While his request was 
pending, Kisor provided additional service records to the VA, including a 
recent diagnosis of PTSD and other records documenting his participation in 
combat.14  In response to the reopened claim, the RO agreed that Kisor 
suffered from PTSD, and granted him benefits in September 2007.15  The 
 
 6.  See infra Section IV.C. 
 7.  467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
 8.   See infra Section IV.A–B. 
 9.  See infra Section IV.D. 
 10.  Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2409 (2019).  
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting J.A. 21), aff’g Kisor v. 
McDonald, No. 14-2811, 2016 WL 337517 (Vet. App. Jan. 27, 2016). 
 13.  Id. at 1362. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
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benefits, however, only extended from the date of his 2006 request to reopen, 
rather than from the date of his 1982 application.16 
Kisor subsequently filed a Notice of Disagreement17 in November 2007, 
arguing that the effective date of his benefits should have been earlier than 
June 5, 2006.18  The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed the RO’s 
decision.19  First, the Board ruled that the decision was final and unreviewable 
since Kisor failed to appeal the 1982 decision.20  Second, the Board explained 
that under VA regulations,21 retroactive benefits could only be awarded if it 
found “relevant official service department records that . . .  had not been 
associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim.”22  The 
Board then determined Kisor’s additional “records were not ‘relevant’” 
because they related only to a current disability rather than a prior diagnosis.23  
Kisor sought review in the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which 
affirmed the Board’s decision for generally the same reasons.24 
Kisor then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit.25  The court rejected Kisor’s argument that a “relevant” 
record could concern other criteria for receiving disability benefits instead of 
having to relate to the basis of a prior denial.26  Finding the VA regulation 
“ambiguous as to the meaning of the term ‘relevant,’” the Federal Circuit 
explained that it “defer[s] to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation 
‘as long as the regulation is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is 
neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent.’”27 In the court’s view, the 
Board’s ruling was based on the premise that “‘relevant’ mean[t] 
noncumulative and pertinent to the matter at issue in the case.”28  Finding the 
 
 16.  Id. at 1363. 
 17.  A Notice of Disagreement is an appeal of an agency’s decision in the form of “a written 
communication from the claimant or the claimant’s representative expressing dissatisfaction or 
disagreement with an adjudicative determination of an agency of original jurisdiction.”  33 Fed. 
Proc., L. Ed. § 79:210 (2020); 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (2019).  
 18.  Kisor, 869 F.3d at 1362.  
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c) (2019) (permitting the VA to reconsider a claim “if [the] VA 
receives or associates with the claims file relevant official service department records that existed 
and had not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim”). 
 22.  Kisor, 869 F.3d at 1363. 
 23.  Id. at 1364. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 1365.  
 26.  Id. at 1366. 
 27.  Id. at 1367; see Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (explaining the agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulations is “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with 
the regulation’” (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 
(1989))).  
 28.  Kisor, 869 F.3d at 1368. 
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Board’s interpretation not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent” with the VA 
regulation, the court accordingly affirmed the Board’s decision.29 
Kisor petitioned to the Supreme Court, which subsequently granted 
certiorari solely “to decide whether to overrule Auer and . . . Seminole 
Rock.”30  
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
While there is disagreement and uncertainty as to the legal foundations 
of deference doctrine, courts have historically given executive agencies a 
degree of leeway in interpreting their governing statutes and regulations.31  
The Court’s modern deference doctrine emerged out of the administrative 
state’s expansion in size and scope during the New Deal and World War II.32  
It would take, however, an additional fifty years for the doctrine to ripen into 
the highly deferential, and contentious standard at issue in Kisor.33  After 
decades of deference doctrine’s expansion, the Court’s conservative justices 
endeavored to chip away at the doctrine, gradually calling into question the 
appropriateness, basis, and justification of deference.34  These critiques frame 
the competing views of deference presented by Justices Kagan and Gorsuch 
in Kisor. 
Section A discusses the historical origins of deference.  Section B 
discusses the emergence of the Court’s modern deference doctrine in the 
1940s.  Section C traces Seminole Rock’s expansion into Auer’s highly 
deferential standard.  Lastly, Section D describes the conservative pushback 
against deference and the calls to abrogate Auer and Seminole Rock. 
A.  Deference’s Historic Roots Emerged During the Nineteenth 
Century and Through the New Deal. 
Courts have long granted varying degrees of deference to the other 
branches’ statutory and regulatory interpretations.  Early courts recognized 
that the views of those who drafted, enacted, and implemented the law were 
of value when tasked with interpreting a textual ambiguity.35  Though courts 
 
 29.  Id. at 1368–69. 
 30.  Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2409 (2019). 
 31.  See infra Section II.A. 
 32.  See infra Section II.B. 
 33.  See infra Section II.C. 
 34.  See infra Section II.D. 
 35.  See, e.g., Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. 206, 209–10 (1827) (explaining that “the 
contemporaneous construction of those who were called upon to act under the law, and were 
appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very great respect”); see also McCulloch 
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819) (explaining that longstanding “exposition[s] of the 
constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts . . . ought not to be lightly disregarded”); 
Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299, 306, 309 (1803) (holding that the “practice” of judges riding circuit 
without “distinct commissions” constituted a strong “contemporary interpretation” of the 
Constitution). 
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began affording greater controlling weight to executive interpretations 
around the turn of the twentieth century,36 there was still no general doctrine 
of deference.  Though willing to grant great weight to an agency’s 
conclusions of fact and law, courts still enjoyed wide discretion over how 
much weight to give to an agency’s determinations.37  During the New Deal, 
deference doctrine was somewhat unpredictable and multifarious: Courts 
were more inclined to defer on questions of fact, but courts were still unsure 
as to the appropriate weight that should be afforded to questions of law.38 
A series of decisions from 1936 to 1944 affirmed the Court’s reluctance 
to disturb agency interpretations provided in specific, adjudicatory 
applications.  This reluctance stemmed both from acknowledgement of an 
agency’s technical expertise and from Congress’s delegation of authority to 
the agency.  The Court recognized that an agency’s administrative experience 
necessarily implied subject matter expertise which warranted limited judicial 
interference in an agency’s decision.39  Further, the Court recognized 
deference as a means to respect Congress’s legislative choices to delegate 
administrative power and decision-making discretion.40 
 
 36.  See, e.g., Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 108–110 (1904) (deferring to the 
Postmaster General’s interpretation of new postal regulations because the interpretation “carr[ied] 
with it a strong presumption of its correctness” and was a reasonable exercise of discretion); United 
States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898) (“The interpretation given to the regulations by the 
department charged with their execution, and by the official who has the power . . . to amend them, 
is entitled to the greatest weight, and we see no reason in this case to doubt its correctness.”). 
 37.  See, e.g., McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 481 (1921) (holding that an agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute “is entitled to great respect and, if acted upon for a number 
of years, will not be disturbed except for cogent reasons”). 
 38.  Compare Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 64–65 (1932) (upholding the judiciary’s ability 
to review agency findings of fact de novo), with St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 
U.S. 38, 54 (1936) (holding that agency findings of fact should be undisturbed), and Norwegian 
Nitrogen Prods. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315–316, 321 (1933) (holding that past 
“administrative practice, consistent and generally unchallenged, will not be overturned” unless 
“shown to be arbitrary”). 
 39.  See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 236 (1936) ( “[The] [C]ourt is not 
at liberty to substitute its own discretion for that of administrative officers who have kept within the 
bounds of their administrative powers.”); see also Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 
322 U.S. 111, 130–31 (1944) (explaining that “[e]veryday experience in the administration of the 
statute” justifies granting deference, so long as an agency’s determination is supported by the record 
and has “a reasonable basis in law”). 
 40.  See Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 403, 412–14 (1941) (deferring to the Bituminous Coal 
Commission’s finding that a railroad which contracted out the mining of coal exclusively to provide 
fuel for its own use was subject to a tax based on the Commission’s interpretation of the term 
“producer-consumer” on grounds that deference was necessary to respect Congress’s express 
delegation of interpretive authority to the Commission); see also Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v. 
Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 146 (1940) (holding that reviewing courts could not overrule 
an agency’s procedural rules since “[i]nterference by the courts is not conducive to the development 
of habits of responsibility in administrative agencies”). 
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B.  The Development of Deference Doctrine’s Modern Framework 
Although the Court entrenched and expanded deference doctrine during 
the late 1930s and early 1940s, courts generally lacked a framework to guide 
the doctrine’s application.  In Skidmore v. Swift41 and Bowles v. Seminole 
Rock & Sand Co.,42 the Court’s efforts to establish such a framework laid the 
foundation of modern deference doctrine. 
1. Modern Deference Doctrine Emerges from the Court’s Decisions 
in Skidmore v. Swift and Seminole Rock v. Bowles  
In Skidmore, the Court endeavored to address the lack of statutory 
guidance as to whether and to what degree deference was warranted.43  
Although the agency’s conclusions stemmed from its accumulated 
experience, knowledge, and expertise, Justice Jackson explained that the 
agency’s conclusions “do not constitute an interpretation of the Act or a 
[judicial] standard,” that would be binding on the lower courts.44  The Court 
also noted that interpretative documents and prior enforcement actions serve 
as a practical guide and provide notice as to how a statute will be applied.45  
In light of this paradox, Justice Jackson established a test to guide courts in 
determining how much weight courts should afford to an agency’s legal 
conclusions.46  Whether deference is warranted “depend[s] [on] the 
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”47  
Following Skidmore, inconsistencies plagued the lower courts as to the 
circumstances and degree of deference given to agency interpretations of 
 
 41.  323 U.S. 134 (1944).  
 42.  325 U.S. 410 (1945).  
 43.  323 U.S. at 139 (“[T]here is no statutory provision as to what, if any, deference courts 
should pay to the Administrator’s conclusions.”).  In Skidmore, despite a Wage and Hour Division 
Bulletin interpreting “[h]ours worked” to include any “time given by the employee to the employer,” 
the district court concluded that time spent waiting on-call “does not constitute hours worked, for 
which overtime compensation [was] due.”  Id. at 136–38.  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court, but the Supreme Court reversed, relying on the Wage 
and Hour Division’s interpretation of the text provided in the Bulletin.  Id. at 140.  
 44.  Id. at 139.  
 45.  Id. at 137–138. 
 46.  Id. at 140. 
 47.  Id.  
2020] SUPPORTIVE YET SKEPTIC: KISOR V. WILKIE 67 
statutes and regulations.48  The following year, the court sought to resolve the 
lower court confusion in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.49 
Seminole Rock concerned the meaning of “highest price” within the 
context of Maximum Price Regulation No. 188.50  The Office of Price 
Administration (“OPA”) sought to enjoin Seminole Rock from selling 
crushed stone at a rate above the regulation’s established maximum rate.51  
Writing for the Court, Justice Murphy explained that, for issues of statutory 
interpretation of administrative regulations, “a court must necessarily look to 
the administrative construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words 
used is in doubt.”52  Though he noted that congressional intent and 
constitutional issues may be relevant for resolving an ambiguity, “the 
ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of 
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”53  According to Justice Murphy, the “only tools” available to the 
Court were the regulation’s text and the “relevant interpretations of the 
Administrator.”54 
Engaging with the text of the regulation, Justice Murphy found the term 
“highest price” susceptible to three potential meanings, but found the only 
appropriate meaning to be the price charged for actual delivery of an article.55  
Justice Murphy then concluded that since OPA had uniformly taken the same 
position in defining “highest price,” OPA’s interpretation controlled.56  Thus, 
in Seminole Rock, the Court’s attempt to resolve inconsistencies in the lower 
courts resulted in a new standard of deference that provided controlling 
weight to agency actions with a more limited scope of judicial review than of 
Skidmore. 
 
 48.  Compare Bowles v. Nu Way Laundry Co., 144 F.2d 741, 746 (10th Cir. 1944) (finding 
that the OPA Administrator’s interpretations of regulations, “if not controlling, [were] entitled to 
great weight so long as they d[id] not distort or pervert the plain intendment of the Act”), with 
Bowles v. Simon, 145 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1944) (concluding that courts may follow the 
Administrator’s interpretations, but rejecting the argument that such interpretations are controlling), 
and Lubin v. Streg, 56 F. Supp. 146, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1944) (stating that while OPA interpretations 
are entitled to respect, “they are not binding authority”). 
 49.  325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
 50.  Id. at 412.  The OPA promulgated Maximum Price Regulation No. 188 under the Price 
Adjustment Act.  Id. at 413.  This regulation established a nationwide price freeze and prohibited a 
seller of specified building materials and consumer goods (including crushed stone) from charging 
more than the price charged during the specified base period of March 1–31, 1942.  Id. at 411–13. 
 51.  Id. at 412.  
 52.  Id. at 414. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 414–15 (quoting Maximum Price Reduction No. 188 § 1499.153(a)(2)(i)). 
 56.  Id. at 417–18 ( “Any doubts concerning this interpretation . . . are removed by reference to 
the administrative construction of this method of computing the ceiling price [provided in an OPA 
issued bulletin].”). 
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2. The Administrative Procedure Act Restates the Law of Judicial 
Review 
Three years after Seminole Rock, Congress enacted the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”).57  Section 702 of the APA confers the right to 
judicial review to any person harmed, “adversely affected or aggrieved by 
agency action.”58  Section 706 codifies the scope of judicial review.59  Under 
section 706, a “reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, 
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning 
or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”60  The Attorney General’s 
Manual, issued immediately after the APA’s passage, described section 706 
as a restatement of the law of judicial review with respect to agency actions.61  
Though there is little evidence in the legislative history as to whether 
Congress intended section 706 to speak to the issue of judicial deference to 
agency decisions, the Court has generally interpreted section 706 to permit 
agency deference.62  More recently, however, the Court’s conservatives have 
called into question whether deference is permissible under section 706 and 
whether section 706 only permits de novo review.63 
 
57.  Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596) (1966)).  
 58.  5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018). 
59.  Id. § 706(2)(A)–(F) (“[Courts may] hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, 
and conclusions found to be: (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity ; (C) in 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without 
observance of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject 
to sections 556 and 557 of this title [5 U.S.C. §§ 556–57] or otherwise reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute; or (F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are 
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.”). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  TOM C. CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 94 (1947) (“The intended result of the introductory clause of 
[section 706] is to restate the existing law as to the area of reviewable agency action.”). 
 62.  See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (citing section 706 in 
holding that deference is appropriate given an explicit or implicit delegation of interpretive authority 
from Congress); Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v. Fox Television Studios, 556 U.S. 502, 513–14 (2009) 
(explaining that, under the narrow standard of review established in section 706(2)(A), “‘a court is 
not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,’ and should ‘uphold a decision of less than ideal 
clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned’” (internal citation omitted) (quoting 
Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas–Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974))). 
 63.  See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, 
J., concurring) (arguing that the APA requires de novo review, rather than permits Chevron 
deference). 
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C.  Deference Doctrine Gradually Expanded over the Last Half of the 
Twentieth Century 
Though Seminole Rock introduced a new standard of deference, the case 
saw little application during the 1940s and 1950s.64  Beginning with Udall v. 
Tallman,65 however, the Court “rediscovered” Seminole Rock and ushered in 
the era of deference doctrine’s expansion, which ultimately culminated in the 
Auer v. Robbins decision.66  The Court, nonetheless, refined the deference 
doctrine by distinguishing the agency’s interpretation of a statute from the 
agency’s interpretation of its regulations.67 
1.  Rediscovering Seminole Rock’s “Controlling Weight” Language 
The Court’s decision in Tallman began the era of deference doctrine’s 
expansion.68  In Tallman, the Court deferred to the Secretary of the Interior’s 
interpretation of a Bureau of Land Management order regulating oil and gas 
leasing.69 
First, the Court noted that Tallman had notice of the Secretary’s 
interpretation prior to submitting his application.70  The Court then 
emphasized the principle that long-standing interpretations of textual 
ambiguities made by those delegated administrative authority are “entitled to 
great respect” and should “not be disturbed except for cogent reasons.”71  In 
the context of ambiguous regulations, the Court determined deference to be 
“even more clearly in order.”72  Relying on Seminole Rock, the Court 
determined that so long as the agency’s “interpretation is not unreasonable,” 
then the agency’s interpretation of the regulation warranted controlling 
weight.73  After Tallman, the Court began employing Seminole Rock’s 
“controlling weight” language with greater frequency, further solidifying the 
 
 64.  Between 1945 and 1965, the Court cited Seminole Rock only twice.  See M. Kraus & Bros. 
Inc. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 622 (1946) (citing Seminole Rock in relation to a timing issue 
concerning a conviction under Maximum Price Regulation No. 269); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 
331, 355 (1955) (Reed, J., dissenting) (“Such reasonable interpretation promptly adopted and long-
continued by the President and the Board should be respected by the courts.  That has been judicial 
practice heretofore.”). 
 65.  380 U.S. 1 (1965). 
 66.  519 U.S. 452 (1997); see infra Section II.C.1, C.3. 
 67.  See infra Section II.C.2. 
 68.  Tallman, 380 U.S. at 22–23. 
 69.  Id. at 16–18.  After initially suspending oil and gas leases in a part of Alaska, the Bureau 
of Land Management issued an order reopening the lands to leasing.  Id. at 7.  Tallman applied, but 
Interior rejected his application.  Id. at 2–3.  The Secretary interpreted the suspension order as to 
have not expressly barred future oil and gas leasing, thereby permitting consideration of any pending 
applications filed during the suspension period.  Id. at 6. 
 70.  Id. at 17 (explaining that “[t]he Secretary’s interpretation had . . . been a matter of public 
record”). 
 71.  Id. at 18 (citing McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 480–81 (1921)). 
 72.  Id. at 16. 
 73.  Id. at 18. 
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doctrine and applying it to agency interpretations of statutes in addition to 
interpretations of regulations.74 
2.  Chevron Leads to a Distinction Between Deference to Statutory 
Interpretations and Deference to Interpretions of Regulations 
By the early 1980s, though the core tenants of deference doctrine were 
entrenched, the Court still lacked a general guiding framework as to when 
deference applied.75  In 1984, the Court provided such a framework in 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.76  In Chevron, 
the Court held that the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia erred by ignoring the EPA’s definition of the term “source” to 
strike down an EPA regulation.77  Noting a “long recognized” tradition of 
deference to agency statutory interpretations,78 the Court established a two-
step test to guide judicial review of an agency’s interpretation of a statute.79  
First, courts must evaluate “whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue.”80 If so, then the court “must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”81  Second, “if the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the Court must 
consider whether the agency’s interpretation is a “permissible construction 
 
 74.  See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980) (deferring to the 
Federal Reserve Board’s interpretation of the Truth in Lending Act because “[t]he Act is best 
construed by those who gave it substance in promulgating regulations thereunder”); United States 
v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872–73 (1977) (accepting the government’s interpretation as correct 
since it “[was] not plainly inconsistent with the wording of the regulations”); Ehlert v. United States, 
402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971) (explaining that, in light of an ambiguity, the Court was “obligated to regard 
as controlling a reasonable, consistently applied administrative interpretation”); United States v. 
Chicago, 400 U.S. 8, 10 (1970) (deferring to the Interstate Commerce Commission’s interpretation 
of the word “train” in the Interstate Commerce Act); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Stanisic, 
395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969) (“[W]e find it dispositive that the agency responsible for promulgating and 
administering the regulation has interpreted it to apply even when the vessel has departed.”); Thorpe 
v. Hous. Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969) (deferring to a Housing and Urban 
Development circular issued while the related case was pending before the Court). 
 75.  Compare Fed. Election Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S 27, 
31–32 (1981) (explaining that while courts are obligated to “reject administrative 
constructions . . . inconsistent with the statutory mandate” or legislative purpose, deference is 
warranted so long as the construction is reasonable), with Sec. & Exch. Comm’n. v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 
103, 118 (1978) (rejecting the Securities and Exchange Commission’s interpretation on grounds 
that “the mere issuance of consecutive summary suspension orders, without a concomitant exegesis 
of the statutory authority for doing so, obviously lacks ‘power to persuade’ as to the existence of 
such authority” and that prior administrative practice does not relieve the Court of its “responsibility 
to determine whether that practice is consistent with the agency’s statutory authority”); see also 
supra Section II.A (describing deference doctrine’s core tenants). 
 76.  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 77.  Id. at 866. 
 78.  Id. at 844; see also supra notes 35–37. 
 79.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
 80.  Id. at 842.  
 81.  Id. at 842–43. 
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of the statute.”82  Under Chevron, statutory gaps are presumed to be 
delegations of legislative authority to an agency, and reasonable, gap-filling 
regulations are given “controlling weight.”83  
The Court also expressly addressed the role of judicial review with 
respect to agency deference.  It forbade courts from engaging in de novo 
review by independently interpreting a statute in light of an ambiguity.84  The 
Court noted that judges could use the “traditional tools of statutory 
construction” to construe Congress’s intent “on the precise question at 
issue.”85  Chevron’s rule firmly stayed within the boundaries of section 706 
by permitting courts to strike down interpretations deemed to be “arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”86 
Even though Chevron and subsequent cases applying it established 
some limitations on deference to an agency’s interpretations of statutes,87  the 
Court’s deference doctrine with respect to interpretations of agency 
regulations continued to expand.88  In Martin v. Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Commission,89 the Court reasoned that Congress assumed 
courts would defer to an agency’s interpretation of their regulations so long 
as the interpretation is reasonable since “Congress intended to invest 
interpretive power in the administrative actor in the best position to develop” 
such expertise.90  In Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala,91 the Court 
noted that there were multiple possible interpretations of a regulation 
promulgated pursuant to the Medicare Act, and the Court stated that it owed 
“substantial deference” to the Secretary of Health and Human Service’s 
construction.92  The Court explained that it was obligated to defer to an 
agency’s interpretation that was “as plausible as” other possible 
 
 82.  Id. at 843. 
 83.  Id. at 844. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 843 n.9. 
 86.  Id. at 844. 
 87.  See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988) (refusing to grant 
“[d]eference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency’s convenient litigating position”); 
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962) (“The courts may not accept 
appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency [orders].”). 
 88.  See, e.g., Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (“As we have often stated, 
provided an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations does not violate the Constitution or a 
federal statute, it must be given ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation.’” (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))); 
Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986) (“[T]he Court of Appeals’ holding runs roughshod over 
the established proposition that an agency’s construction of its own regulations is entitled to 
substantial deference.”).  
 89.  499 U.S. 144 (1991). 
 90.  Id. at 153–57 (“[T]he presumption that Congress delegates interpretative lawmaking power 
to the agency rather than to the reviewing court” rests in the agency’s “historical familiarity and 
policymaking expertise.”). 
 91.  512 U.S. 504 (1994). 
 92.  Id. at 512.  
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interpretations93 rather than deciding which possible interpretation “best 
serves the regulatory purpose.”94  Thomas Jefferson University’s “plausible” 
standard, undergirded by the presumption established in Martin, expanded 
deference’s scope further beyond what the Court established in Tallman. 
3.  Deference Reaches Its High Watermark in Auer v. Robbins 
The expansion of the agency deference doctrine concluded with Auer v. 
Robbins.95  The issue in Auer concerned whether police officers were exempt 
from receiving overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) 
because they were salaried workers, not hourly workers.96  Petitioners 
brought suit against the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners, arguing 
that because their pay “could be reduced for a variety of disciplinary 
infractions related to the ‘quality or quantity’ of work performed,” they were 
not exempt from overtime pay as salaried employees.97  The district court 
ruled in favor of the Police Commissioners, finding that they “were paid on 
a salary basis,” and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 
in relevant part, affirmed.98 
Rejecting the petitioner’s argument, the Court deferred to the Secretary 
of Labor’s interpretation of “salary basis.”99  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Scalia explained that since “the salary-basis test is a creature of the 
Secretary’s own regulations, [the Secretary’s] interpretation of it 
is . . . controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.’”100  Since the plain meaning of the phrase “subject to” could 
support the Secretary’s interpretation, Justice Scalia, without engaging in an 
independent inquiry into the ambiguity, concluded that the “deferential 
standard” was “easily met.”101  That the Secretary provided the interpretation 
“in the form of a legal brief” did not “make it unworthy of deference,” since 
it was not “a ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ advanced by an agency seeking to 
defend past agency action against attack.”102  In contrast to Chevron, where 
deference is owed only to “reasonable” interpretations of statutes, Auer stood 
for a separate, higher degree of deference specific only to agency 
 
 93.  Id. at 517 (quoting Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993)). 
 94.  Id. at 512. 
 95.  519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 96.  Id. at 455. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 455–56; see Auer v. Robbins, 65 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming the holding that 
certain police officers were exempt from overtime pay and reversing the holding finding two 
categories of police sergeants partially non-exempt). 
 99.  Id. at 461. 
 100.  Id. (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 462 (alteration in original) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 
204, 212 (1988)).  
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interpretations of regulations provided in guidance documents, adjudications, 
or briefs.103 
D.  Conservatives Push Back Against Deference’s Expansion 
Auer marked the last major expansion of the Court’s deference doctrine.  
While in subsequent cases the Court attempted to refine its application of 
Auer deference,104 the Court’s standard of review for an agency’s 
interpretation of its regulations remained highly deferential.105  The Court’s 
conservatives, recognizing Chevron’s distinction between interpretations of 
statutes and regulations, began to reevaluate deference doctrine’s legal 
foundation and potentially do away with it altogether. 
1.  Attempts to Refine Deference Incite a Broader Call to Reexamine 
Deference as a Whole 
The first major case concerning Auer deference, Christensen v. Harris 
County,106 happened to be the only time the Court refused to grant an agency 
deference under Auer.107  In Christensen, the Court considered whether to 
defer to a Department of Labor opinion letter interpreting regulations 
promulgated under the FLSA.108  Explaining that interpretations provided in 
opinion letters “lack the force of law,” the Court found Skidmore, rather than 
Auer, to be the appropriate standard.109  Justice Thomas cautioned that 
granting deference would permit the agency “to create de facto a new 
regulation.”110  Justice Scalia disagreed.  In Justice Scalia’s view, such 
opinion letters warranted deference so long as “it represent[ed] the 
 
 103.  The Court, however, has declined deference to interpretations it classifies as post-hoc 
rationalizations and “convenient litigating position[s].” See Bowen, 488 U.S. at 212–13. 
 104.  See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (“Auer deference is 
warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous. . . .   To defer to the agency’s 
position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de 
facto a new regulation.  Because the regulation is not ambiguous on the issue of compelled 
compensatory time, Auer deference is unwarranted.”). 
 105.  See, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 226 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
in judgment) (“I do not believe . . . that ‘particular deference’ is owed ‘to an agency interpretation 
of “longstanding” duration’ . . . so long as the most recent interpretation is reasonable its antiquity 
should make no difference.”). 
 106.  529 U.S. 576 (2000); see Peter M. Torstensen Jr., The Curious Case of Seminole Rock: 
Revisiting Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Their Ambiguous Regulations , 91 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 815, 826 (2015) (“Three years later, in Christensen v. Harris County, the Court, for 
the first and only time, declined to apply Seminole Rock to an agency interpretation of a regulation 
on the ground that the interpretation was plainly erroneous.”). 
 107.  Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588.  
 108.  Id.  
 109.  Id. at 587. 
 110.  Id. at 588.  Justice Thomas reasoned that since the regulation in question was not 
ambiguous, allowing informal interpretive documents to change its meaning allowed the agency to 
establish a new regulation altogether.  Id. 
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authoritative view” of the agency, irrespective of the means by which it is 
expressed.111 
The following year, the Court refined and narrowed Chevron’s 
framework in United States v. Mead.112  Finding that Chevron deference did 
not apply to the ruling letters issued by the United States Customs changing 
the tariff classification of Mead’s day planners,113 the Court held that before 
applying Chevron’s first step, the judge must determine whether Congress 
appeared to delegate interpretative authority to the agency.114  Under Mead 
agency interpretations warrant deference only if they are promulgated under 
the agency’s congressionally delegated authority and have the effect of 
law.115  An interpretation that fails under Mead is only entitled to persuasive 
weight under Skidmore.116 
In a fierce dissent, Justice Scalia argued the Court “collapse[d]” 
Chevron, by “announcing . . . a presumption” against deference.117  In his 
view, Mead’s “background rule” required judges, rather than the agencies, to 
evaluate legislative ambiguities.118  This, in turn contravenes Chevron’s 
“legal presumption” that the only legal question is whether an interpretation 
exceeds “the scope of discretion” conferred by the statutory ambiguity.119  By 
delegating interpretative authority to the agencies, Congress intended to 
confer them with “the flexibility of interpreting [an] ambiguous statute.”120  
Permitting the courts to authoritatively and definitively construe the meaning 
of a statute would frustrate the entire purpose behind the APA’s rulemaking 
exemptions.121 
2.  Mounting Conservative Criticism Calls Auer Into Question. 
The Court’s first consequential examination of Auer occurred in Talk 
America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,122 where the Court granted 
Auer deference to a Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
interpretation of regulations promulgated pursuant to the 
 
 111.  Id. at 591 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).  Justices Breyer and 
Ginsburg took issue with Justice Scalia’s dismissal of Skidmore, arguing that it “retain[ed] legal 
vitality” and that, where Chevron did not apply, courts were still obligated to “pay particular 
attention to the views of an expert agency.”  Id. at 596–97 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 112.  533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 113.  Id. at 226–27. 
 114.  Id. at 229. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. at 235. 
 117.  Id. at 240 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 118.  Id. at 243. 
 119.  Id. at 242 n.2. 
 120.  Id. at 244. 
 121.  Id. at 241–44. 
 122.  564 U.S. 50 (2011). 
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Telecommunications Act of 1996.123  Despite the fact that the FCC’s 
interpretation contradicted a previous order and was presented in an amicus 
brief filed by the Commission, the Court still found deference to be 
appropriate.124  The Court found that the FCC’s revised definition of 
“dedicated transport” was reasonable given the D.C. Circuit’s question of the 
old definition, and that the new definition did not conflict with the established 
definition of “interconnection.”125 
Justice Scalia objected to the Court’s application of Auer, expressly 
calling the doctrine into question.126  Though he noted that Auer appeared to 
be a “natural corollary” to Chevron, Justice Scalia’s skepticism of Auer’s 
validity stems from the key distinction between the doctrines: Chevron 
concerns interpretations by the body tasked with administering a statute, 
whereas Auer involves interpretations by the body that both writes and 
administers the regulation.127  Thus, the separation between the legislative 
and executive functions in Chevron are absent in Auer.128  In his view, Auer 
deference contravened the “fundamental principles of separation of powers” 
by allowing “the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.”129  
Such comingling of judicial and legislative authority not only cedes power to 
the executive branch, but would incentivize agencies to pass vague rules, 
thereby “frustrat[ing] the notice and predictability purposes of 
rulemaking.”130 
The conservative call to revisit Auer gained greater fervor in Decker v. 
Northwest Environmental Defense Center.131  In Decker, the Court applied 
Auer deference to the EPA’s interpretation of the Industrial Stormwater 
 
 123.  Id. at 53, 64.  Similar to Auer, since no statute or regulation addressed the specific issue in 
question, the agency’s amicus curiae brief provided the most authoritative interpretation.  Id. at 59; 
see also Chase Bank USA, N.A v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 208 (2011) (stating that deference to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation advanced in a legal brief is appropriate if the 
interpretation is consistent with the regulatory text). 
 124.  Talk America, 564 U.S. at 64.  (“[A]lthough the FCC concedes that it is advancing a novel 
interpretation of its longstanding interconnection regulations, novelty alone is not a reason to refuse 
deference.”). 
 125.  Id. at 61–63. 
 126.  Id. at 68 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 127.  Id.  
 128.  Id. (explaining how in Chevron, “[t]he legislative and executive functions are not 
combined,” but that in Auer both functions are “united in the same person” (quoting MONTESQUIEU, 
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151–52 (O. Piest ed., T. Nugent transl. 1949))). 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. at 69.  Three years later, Justice Alito incorporated Justice Scalia’s critiques into his 
opinion in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 156, 158 (2012) (explaining 
that deference “creates a risk that agencies will promulgate vague and open-ended regulations” and 
that “defer[ing] to the agency’s interpretation . . . would seriously undermine the principle that 
agencies should provide regulated parties ‘fair warning of the conduct [a regulation] prohibits or 
requires’” (quoting Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 790 F.2d 
154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986))). 
 131.  568 U.S. 597 (2013). 
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Rule.132  In dueling footnotes, both parties addressed whether the Court 
should revisit Auer.133  In Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion, he 
suggested Seminole Rock would be better reconsidered in a case where “the 
issue is properly raised and argued,” despite noting the “serious questions” 
raised about Auer’s validity.134  
Again dissenting, Justice Scalia provided several justifications for doing 
away with the Auer doctrine.135  He argued that subsequent cases had failed 
to explain Seminole Rock’s “controlling weight” requirement.136  Granting 
agencies both the power to prescribe regulations and the power to interpret 
those regulations allows them to circumvent notice-and-comment procedures 
by promulgating vague rules with plans to later issue interpretations.137  
Chevron, unlike Auer, is acceptable because a separate body interprets the 
statutory language.138  
Two years later, the Court’s decision in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers 
Association139 would set the stage for revisiting Auer.  In arguing to uphold 
precedent that established a right to notice-and-comment procedures when an 
agency changes its interpretation of a rule,140 the respondents presented an 
alternative argument suggesting that since Auer entitled deference to 
interpretive rules, such rules have the force of law.141  The majority did not 
fully engage with the respondent’s argument and held that notice-and-
comment procedures were unnecessary for amendments or repeals of 
interpretative rules.142  The Court’s conservatives, however, viewed the 
respondent’s arguments as license to attack Auer, with each writing separate 
 
 132.  Id. at 613 (“It is well established that an agency’s interpretation need not be the only 
possible reading of a regulation—or even the best one—to prevail.”). 
 133.  The respondents suggested revisiting Auer without presenting an argument; the petitioners 
disagreed, but also without making an argument.  Id. at 615–16 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Addressing the agency expertise argument, Justice Scalia stated that such expertise should 
have “nothing to do with who should interpret regulations.”  Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
Instead, he argues that “the purpose of interpretation is to  . . . ‘say what the law is.’”  Id.  (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
 136.  Id. at 617–18 (“The first case to apply [Seminole Rock] offered no justification whatever—
just the ipse dixit that ‘the administrative interpretation . . . becomes of controlling weight unless it 
is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock, 325 
U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (alteration in original))). 
 137.  Id. at 620 (“[T]he power to prescribe is augmented by the power to interpret . . . .”). 
 138.  Id. (“Congress cannot enlarge its own power through Chevron—whatever it leaves vague 
in the statute will be worked out by someone else.”). 
 139.  135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).  At issue was the validity of a Wage and Hour Division opinion 
letter revising a previously held, and subsequently withdrawn, interpretation of wage and hour 
regulations for mortgage-loan officers promulgated under the FLSA.  Id. at 1204–05. 
 140.  Id. at 1203–04. 
 141.  Id. at 1208 n.4. 
 142.  Id. at 1206, 1208 n.4 
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opinions.143  To Justice Scalia, “abandoning Auer and applying the [APA] as 
written” would restore the APA’s original balance regarding deference to 
agency interpretations.144  Justice Thomas suggested that Seminole Rock 
effects “a transfer of judicial power to the Executive Branch,” as deference 
precludes judges from exercising their interpretive powers thus undermining 
the judiciary’s power “as a check on the political branches.”145  Given the 
“serious constitutional questions” raised by Seminole Rock deference, Justice 
Thomas expressed that it “should be reconsidered in an appropriate case.”146  
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
That “appropriate case” appeared in Kisor v. Wilkie.147  In Kisor, despite 
unanimously ruling on the merits to vacate the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision to grant Auer deference to the VA’s interpretation of its 
benefits regulations, the Court voted five-to-four to uphold Auer.148  Justice 
Kagan, joined by Justices Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, limited 
Auer by adopting a two-step framework for its application.  First, courts 
cannot award deference unless, after “exhaust[ing] all the ‘traditional tools’ 
of construction,” the regulation remains genuinely ambiguous.149  Second, a 
reviewing court must evaluate the reasonableness of the agency’s 
interpretation, considering “whether the character and context of the agency 
interpretation entitles it to controlling weight.”150  On the merits, the Court 
concluded that the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals failed to “make a 
conscientious effort to determine . . . whether the regulation [had] more than 
one reasonable meaning,” and that the lower court concluded too hastily that 
Auer deference applied.151 
A.  Justice Kagan’s Opinion 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan based her decision on the 
presumption that Congress intended courts to defer to agency interpretations 
of their own ambiguous rules.152  Justice Kagan noted that agencies have the 
authority to apply meaning to their own regulations.153  Agencies are in the 
 
 143.  Id. at 1217 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1211–1213 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice 
Alito simply wrote to say he agreed with his colleagues that Seminole Rock and Auer should be 
revisited.  Id. at 1210–11 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 144.  Id. at 1213 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 145.  Id. at 1217 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 146.  Id. at 1225; see supra Section II.B.1. 
 147.  139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
 148.  Id. at 2408. 
 149.  Id. at 2415. 
 150.  Id. at 2416. 
 151.  Id. at 2423–24. 
 152.  Id. at 2414. 
 153.  Id. at 2412.  
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best position to interpret the “original meaning” of a regulation, given their 
“direct insight” into the rule’s intended meaning.154  Congress grants the 
agencies rulemaking power and authorization to “fill out the statutory 
scheme” because agencies are more adept in making specific policy 
judgments.155  Given Congress’s preference for the uniform administration156 
of federal law, the presumption that Congress intended for deference “reflects 
the well-known benefits of uniformity in interpreting genuinely ambiguous 
rules.”157  Since the need for uniformity is of particular relevance for highly 
technical and complex regulations, deference “serves to ensure consistency 
in federal regulatory law.”158 
Justice Kagan then addressed the limits of Auer deference.  She 
cautioned that “Auer deference . . . ‘does not apply in all cases.’”159  Where 
the presumption for deference does not apply, no deference is owed and an 
agency interpretation merely has persuasive power.160  But, when the 
presumption might apply, Justice Kagan explained that deference is only 
appropriate if the regulation “is genuinely ambiguous.”161  Without 
uncertainty, there is no need for deference.162  To evaluate whether an 
ambiguity exists, the court must look to “the text, structure, history, and 
purpose of a regulation” as if there is “no agency to fall back on.”163 
Incorporating Chevron’s footnote nine principle, Justice Kagan noted that if  
exhausting the entire legal toolkit fails to resolve the interpretative question, 
only then may the judge determine a statute to be “genuinely ambiguous.”164 
For Auer deference to apply, the agency’s reading of the statutory 
language “must . . . be ‘reasonable.’”165  Determining reasonableness 
requires the court to “make an independent inquiry into whether the character 
and context of the agency interpretation entitles it to controlling weight.”166  
Recognizing the open-endedness of such an inquiry, Justice Kagan provided 
three guideposts for courts: (1) the interpretation must be the agency’s 
 
 154.  Id.  Justice Kagan noted that “justification has its limits,” such as in circumstances 
regarding issues an agency failed to anticipate during the rulemaking or “when lots of time has 
passed between the rule’s issuance and its interpretation.”  Id. 
 155.  Id. at 2413. 
  156.  Id. (citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980)). 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. at 2413–14. 
 159.  Id. at 2414 (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012)). 
 160.  Id.  
 161.  Id. at 2414–15. 
 162.  Id. at 2415. 
 163.  Id. (quoting Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991)). 
 164.  Id.  Chevron’s footnote nine principle states that deference is not appropriate if the judge 
is able to determine Congress’s meaning after “employing traditional tools of statutory 
construction.”  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843, n.9 (1984). 
 165. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 
(1994)). 
 166.  Id. at 2416. 
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official position, issued by someone with the policymaking authority167; (2) 
the interpretation must implicate the substantive expertise of the agency;168 
and (3) the interpretation must reflect an agency’s “fair and considered 
judgment.”169  Courts should not grant deference to agency interpretations 
that constitute “convenient litigating position[s],” “post hoc 
rationalization[s],” or new interpretations that may “unfair[ly] surprise 
regulated parties.”170 
After explaining Auer’s new limits, Justice Kagan then addressed 
Auer’s consistency with the APA.  Justice Kagan read section 706 of the 
APA171 as providing two possibilities for judicial review: de novo review of 
the issue, or review of “the agency’s reading for reasonableness.”172  Courts 
act consistently with Congress’s presumption when courts conclude and 
grant deference to an agency’s reasonable reading of an interpretation.173 
Justice Kagan dismissed the argument that Auer violated the 
requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking in section 553 of the 
APA.174  Just as the meaning of a legislative rule promulgated through notice-
and-comment “remains in the hands of [the court],” so does an agency’s 
interpretation of a notice-and-comment rule.175  In either circumstance, she 
explained, the court has the final say over an agency’s action.176  Justice 
Kagan further rejected the contention that Auer incentivizes agencies to 
purposefully write vague regulations onto which “they can later impose 
whatever interpretation[s] of [the] rules they prefer.”177  She highlighted the 
lack of empirical evidence supporting this claim, and further stated that both 
regulators and regulated parties have a shared interest in the clarity and 
precision of a regulation.178 
Finally, Justice Kagan rejected Kisor’s separation of powers argument 
that deference resulted in the vesting of both judicial and legislative powers 
into a single branch. 179  Noting that courts still “retain[ed] a firm grip on the 
interpretive function,” Justice Kagan stated that the commingling of 
 
  167.  Id. 
  168.  Id. at 2417. 
 169.  Id. (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012)). 
 170.  Id. at 2417–18.  
 171.  See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018) (“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”). 
 172.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2419. 
 173.  Id. 
  174.  Id. at 2420; see also 5 U.S.C § 553 (requiring notice-and-comment procedures for agency 
rulemakings). 
 175.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2420. 
 176.  Id.  (“No binding of anyone occurs merely by the agency’s say-so.”). 
 177.  Id. at 2421. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. 
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legislative and judicial functions has been “endemic in agencies . . . ‘since 
the beginning of the Republic.’”180  Though agency activities may take on 
judicial and legislative forms, they are all “ways of executing a statutory 
plan” fully consistent with an agency’s executive power.181 
Relying on stare decisis, Justice Kagan provided three reasons against 
overruling Auer.  First, she noted the long-standing history of “[d]eference to 
reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous rules.”182  Second, she 
explained that “abandoning Auer . . . would cast doubt on many settled 
constructions of rules.”183  Third, though Congress could have amended the 
APA at any time to require de novo review, Congress chose to accept the 
Court’s “deference regime.”184  Though the power and “far-reaching 
influence” of administrative agencies creates opportunities for their power to 
be abused, that very possibility further justified reinforcing Auer’s limits, 
rather than abandoning the doctrine entirely.185 
B.  Justice Gorsuch’s Concurrence 
Concurring only in the judgment, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices 
Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Alito, lambasted the majority’s decision to uphold 
Auer.186  He described the Court’s decision as “a stay of execution,” which 
kept Auer “on life support” all for the purpose of “pretend[ing] to abide stare 
decisis.”187  In his view, Auer infringed on the court’s fundamental duty: to 
provide an independent judgment on the law.188 
First, Justice Gorsuch traced the history of Auer deference, arguing that 
the case was “little more than an accident.”189  He stated that Skidmore 
“reaffirmed the traditional rule that an agency’s interpretation of the law” 
cannot control the court.190  Seminole Rock, in his view, failed to clarify how 
much “controlling weight” should be placed on an agency’s interpretation.191  
Since the Seminole Rock Court arrived at its decision independent of the 
agency’s interpretation, Seminole Rock is more appropriately tied to 
 
 180.  Id. at 2422 (quoting City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 569 U.S. 290, 304–05 
(2013)). 
 181.  Id.  
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. at 2422–23. 
 185.  Id. at 2423. 
 186.  Id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment). 
 187.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. at 2426. 
 190.  Id.at 2427.  
 191.  Id. at 2428 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). 
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Skidmore.192  Accordingly, Seminole Rock should be read as suggesting that 
agency interpretations are persuasive, but non-binding on the courts.193 
Justice Gorsuch then declared Auer to be “the apotheosis of th[e] line of 
cases” that inappropriately expanded Seminole Rock’s “controlling weight” 
language.194  Since Auer forced judges to set aside their own views on the 
law and accept an agency’s reading, even if it “is not the best one,” Auer 
deference displaced the judiciary’s interpretative process.195  Further attempts 
“to soften Auer’s rigidity” muddled the doctrine and caused “‘widespread 
confusion’ about when and how” it might apply.196  These problems provided 
ample grounds for overruling Auer.197 
Focusing on the APA, Justice Gorsuch described Kisor as the first time 
the Court attempted “to square the Auer doctrine” with section 706.198  In his 
view, section 706 requires a court to determine legal questions on its own, 
rather than under the guidance of executive branch officials.199  Under Justice 
Gorsuch’s reading, section 706 only permits de novo review, since deference 
lets the agency provide the answer to an interpretative question.200  Justice 
Gorsuch further argued that Auer abrogated the distinction between section 
553 rules and interpretations.201  If a court affords a new interpretation 
“controlling weight,” it functionally becomes a new regulation.202  In his 
view, the APA’s requirements imply that an agency cannot amend 
substantive rules outside of section 553’s procedures.203  Ultimately, Justice 
Gorsuch read the APA as countering Congress’s presumption for agency 
deference.204  In his view, the law of judicial review was “confused” at the 
time of the APA’s enactment, and the APA was merely an attempt to clarify 
it.205 
Justice Gorsuch next addressed the separation of powers argument.  He 
argued that Auer “compromised” a fundamental legal principle by requiring 
 
 192.  Id. at 2428–29 (“[In Seminole Rock], the Court declared—for the first time and without 
citing any authority—that ‘if the meaning of [the regulation were] in doubt,’ the agency’s 
interpretation would merit ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.’” (quoting Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414 (1945))). 
 193.  Id. at 2429. 
 194.  Id. (quoting Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414 (1945)).  
 195.  Id. at 2429–30.  
 196.  Id. at 2430 (quoting Kevin Leske, Splits in the Rock: The Conflicting Interpretations of the 
Seminole Rock Deference Doctrine by the U. S. Courts of Appeals, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 787, 832 
(2014)). 
 197.  Id. at 2432. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. at 2434. 
 202.  Id. (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).  
 203.  Id. at 2434–35. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. at 2436. 
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the judge to abide by the agency’s interpretation rather than their own 
independent judgment.206  Justice Gorsuch explained that Auer allows 
agencies to do what Congress cannot: force the courts to interpret and apply 
a law according to another branch’s judgment.207  By requiring adherence to 
agency interpretations different from what the judge considers the best 
possible reading, deference compromises the judiciary’s independence and 
denies litigants the impartial judgment guaranteed by the Constitution.208  
Rather than limiting the scope of judicial power, Justice Gorsuch argued, 
deference co-opts it.209 
Justice Gorsuch then addressed Justice Kagan’s policy arguments.210  To 
have “a government of laws,” he explained, we must be “governed by the 
public meaning” of an agency’s statutes and regulations, not by the agency’s 
intentions.211  Since an agency’s policy judgment is necessarily embodied in 
the regulation, judicial interpretation is no more of an act of policymaking 
than of law.212  Though he agreed that courts should respect an agency’s 
technical expertise, he stated that courts should “remain open to competing 
expert and other evidence supplied in an adversarial setting.”213  As to Justice 
Kagan’s concern regarding uniformity of the law, Justice Gorsuch expressed 
that the “judicial system is more than capable of producing a single, uniform, 
and stable interpretation that will last until the regulation is amended or 
repealed.”214 
Lastly, Justice Gorsuch addressed stare decisis.  Analogizing Auer’s 
doctrine to other tools of interpretation, he argued that statements about 
interpretative methods generally lack the binding force of stare decisis.215  He 
questioned Auer’s “practical benefit” over other standards such as 
Skidmore.216  Further, the scope of the administrative state heightened the 
effect of “deny[ing] citizens an impartial judicial hearing on the meaning of 
disputed regulations.”217   
Ultimately, Justice Gorsuch viewed overruling Auer as “liberating 
courts to decide cases based on their independent judgment.”218  In his view, 
 
 206.  Id. at 2439. 
 207.  Id. (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 95 
(1868)). 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  Id. at 2440. 
 210.  Id. at 2441. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. at 2443. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Id. at 2444. 
 216.  Id. at 2445–46. 
 217.  Id. at 2446–47. 
 218.  Id. at 2447. 
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the Court’s decision “le[ft] Auer so riddled with holes” that courts may view 
it as similarly constraining as Skidmore.219  He concluded by charging a 
future Court to revisit the doctrine and overrule it, either because of the 
ineffectiveness of the doctrine’s new limitations or the frustrating effect that 
the doctrine has on courts’ ability to provide meaningful and impartial 
judicial review of ambiguous regulations.220 
C. Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice Kavanaugh’s Concurrences 
Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh filed separate 
concurring opinions.  Chief Justice Roberts expressed that nothing in the 
Kisor decision directly touched on the issue of Chevron’s applicability.221  
Further, he stated “that the distance between the majority and Justice 
Gorsuch” is smaller than it seems.222  In Chief Justice Roberts’ view, the 
determinative factors for granting deference established by the majority 
parallel the reasons identified by Justice Gorsuch that persuade a court to 
adhere to an agency’s interpretation.223  Despite the distinctions between 
Auer and Skidmore, he suggested “that the cases in which Auer deference is 
warranted largely overlap with the cases in which” the refusal to defer would 
be unreasonable.224  
Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Alito, viewed the rigorous 
application of Chevron’s footnote nine as having an effect akin to formally 
rejecting Auer.225  Kisor requires judges to “engage in appropriately rigorous 
scrutiny of an agency’s interpretation of a regulation,” while “simultaneously 
be[ing] appropriately deferential to an agency’s reasonable policy 
choices.”226 
Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion provides an alternate view of Kisor’s 
supposed fatal effect on Auer to that of Justice Gorsuch.  Yet, Chief Justice 
Roberts’ recognition of Auer’s precedential weight underlies his attempt to 
find common ground between the majority and Justice Gorsuch’s views on 
deference. 
 
 219.  Id. at 2448. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 222.  Id.  
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. at 2424–25. 
 225.  Id. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[T]he footnote [nine] principle . . . means that 
courts will have no reason or basis to put a thumb on the scale in favor of an agency . . . .”); see 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) (“If a court, employing 
traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise 
question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”). 
 226.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2449 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
Despite retaining Auer deference, Kisor stops short of settling the debate 
as to whether Chevron deference will survive the Roberts Court in its current 
form.  In light of Justice Gorsuch’s and Justice Kavanaugh’s efforts to 
undermine and erode the administrative state, Section IV.A addresses how 
Justice Kagan’s opinion realigns Auer to accord with its historical precedent 
and the Chevron framework.  Section IV.B argues that Kisor mitigates Auer’s 
constitutional concerns by requiring more active judicial scrutiny and due 
process than was previously guaranteed under Auer’s standard.  Though the 
compromise struck by Justice Kagan provides a framework for the Court to 
retain some form of deference, Section IV.C discusses how that compromise 
also provides a framework for further narrowing Chevron and indicates 
further judicial balkanization of administrative agencies.  Lastly, Section 
IV.D addresses Kisor in the context of increasingly vocalized attacks on the 
administrative state and its implications, arguing that deference doctrine’s 
future remains unsettled and bleak. 
A.  Kisor’s Framework Realigns Auer Deference to a Form More 
Consistent with Seminole Rock and the Degree of Deference 
Intended by the APA. 
In adopting a new framework, the Court appropriately realigned Auer 
deference to the original test applied in Seminole Rock.  Given Udall v. 
Tallman’s227 misapplication of Seminole Rock as a single-step test, Justice 
Kagan’s opinion corrected the Court’s longstanding misuse of Seminole Rock 
by recasting the doctrine as a two-step inquiry.228  Further, despite 
conservative claims to the contrary, the Court correctly noted that a two-step 
test for reasonableness review comports with the APA, since the Act does not 
expressly mandate de novo review.229 
1.  Justice Kagan’s Opinion Divorces Auer Deference from Udall v. 
Tallman’s Application of Seminole Rock and Realigns the 
Doctrine with Its Original Framework. 
The deference inquiry applied in Auer substantially deviated from the 
framework applied by the Seminole Rock Court.  In Seminole Rock, the 
inquiry focused on the ambiguous provision in question.  Yet, the Tallman 
Court’s misapplication of Seminole Rock shifted the Court’s focus away from 
the ambiguity itself, and more to the reasonableness of the interpretation.  
Given Auer marks the most extreme expansion of Tallman’s approach, 
 
 227.  380 U.S. 1 (1965).  
 228.  See infra Section IV.A.1. 
 229.  See infra Section IV.A.2. 
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Justice Kagan realigns Auer deference with its governing precedent in 
Seminole Rock by directing the Court’s focus back to the regulation. 
Though Seminole Rock’s “controlling weight” language is most often 
read as a single step inquiry, there is an implicit first step.230  For a court to 
decide whether an agency’s regulation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent,” 
it first examines the regulation to determine whether the regulation is 
ambiguous; then, upon such a conclusion, the court must decide if the 
agency’s regulation falls within the boundary of acceptable interpretation.231  
Reading Seminole Rock as establishing a two-step inquiry accords with the 
Court’s disposition of that case.  Unlike the mechanical application of 
deference in Auer, the Seminole Rock Court fully and independently engaged 
with the text to determine whether the provision was ambiguous before 
considering whether the agency’s interpretation justified deference.232  In 
essence, Seminole Rock’s inquiry is not unlike that of Chevron.233 
Seminole Rock’s two-step framework is strikingly absent in Udall v. 
Tallman.  Though the Tallman Court evaluated the text to determine whether 
the Secretary of Interior’s interpretation was “reasonable,” the Court stopped 
short of forming its own conclusion as to the meaning of the regulation.234  
The Court’s inquiry focused solely on the reasonableness of the Secretary’s 
interpretation of the ambiguity, rather than on resolving the ambiguity 
itself.235  Accordingly, the Court’s application of Seminole Rock post-
Tallman almost exclusively centered on the reasonableness of the agency’s 
interpretation at the expense of an independent judicial evaluation of the 
text.236  Auer exemplifies the most extreme extension of this approach.  In 
Auer, not only did the Court not evaluate the regulation in question, but its 
analysis solely concerned defending the reasonableness of the Secretary’s 
interpretation.237 
 
 230.  See Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference to 
Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 70–71 (2000) (explaining that 
reviewing courts must first determine if a regulation is unambiguous before deciding whether to 
grant deference to the agency’s interpretation). 
 231.  Bowles v. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1944). 
 232.  Id. at 415–418; see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2428 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring in judgment) (explaining that the Seminole Rock Court concluded the OPA’s regulation 
was permissible “[o]nly after reaching that conclusion based on its own independent analysis”). 
 233.  Compare Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 865 
(1984) (“First, always, is the question of whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.”), with Seminole 
Rock, 325 U.S. at 414 (“The intention of Congress . . . may be relevant in the first instance in 
choosing between various constructions.” (emphasis added)). 
 234.  Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1965) (“[N]either [the Court of Appeals’ holding] 
nor this Court’s affirmance in any way casts doubt upon the reasonableness of the Secretary’s 
interpretation of the orders at bar . . . .”). 
 235.  Id. at 18–19. 
 236.  See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 513–17 (1994) (framing its 
evaluation of the ambiguity around the reasonableness of the Secretary’s interpretation). 
 237.  Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1997). 
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Thus, the Auer Court’s application of Seminole Rock is wholly distinct 
from deference doctrine’s original application.  Unlike in Seminole Rock, 
where an agency’s interpretation is controlling based on its consistency with 
the statutory scheme, Auer assumes that the interpretation is controlling 
unless demonstrated otherwise.238  As compared to Seminole Rock, a judge’s 
exclusive concern under Auer is the reasonableness of the interpretation 
rather than the meaning of the ambiguity.239  The shift in focus away from 
the regulation’s language results in a lower degree of judicial scrutiny, as the 
judge is no longer independently interpreting the meaning of the 
regulation.240  
Kisor effectively realigns Auer with Seminole Rock.  Kisor’s first 
requirement—that the regulation remain genuinely ambiguous after a judge 
fails to resolve the ambiguity using “all the ‘traditional tools’ of 
construction”—forces the judge to engage directly with the text beyond the 
frame of an agency’s interpretation.241  This requirement, similar to 
Chevron’s first step, is functionally similar to the Court’s approach in 
Seminole Rock.242  Kisor’s second requirement—reasonableness review— is 
explicitly grounded in the review standard established by Chevron.243  
Though the “plainly erroneous or inconsistent” standard in Seminole Rock is 
arguably more deferential than Chevron’s reasonableness standard, in 
practice courts have applied the two standards in a similar fashion.244  Thus,  
Kisor clarifies how the Seminole Rock standard should be applied by aligning 
Auer’s deferential standard with Chevron.  Kisor’s framework reestablishes 
 
 238.  See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 629 (1996) (describing a post-Udall 
application of Seminole Rock where “the Court made no effort to decide how it would have 
[independently] construed the regulation”). 
 239.  See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 614 (2013) (focusing on whether the 
agency’s interpretation is reasonable rather than on whether it is the best reading to clarify the 
ambiguity).  
 240.  See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1219–20 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in judgment); see also Manning, supra note 238, at 639 (arguing that Seminole Rock 
involves “no independent interpretive check” of an administrative agency’s “lawmaking”). 
 241.  Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, n.9 (1984)). 
 242.  See Kevin O’Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place: A New Approach to 
Agency Deference, 46 CONN. L. REV. 227, 245–46 (2013) (explaining that in Seminole Rock, “the 
Court performed a much more searching inquiry to ascertain the meaning of the regulation than the 
plain language of the test it purported to apply”); see also Angstreich, supra note 230, at 70–71 
(“[A]lthough formally stated as a one-step test, Seminole Rock implicitly involves a preliminary 
analysis that mirrors Chevron step one.”). 
 243.  Kisor, 588 U.S. at 2416 (“Under Auer, as under Chevron, the agency’s reading must fall 
‘within the bounds of reasonable interpretation.’” (quoting City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’n 
Comm’n, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013))). 
 244.  See Angstreich, supra note 230, at 70, n.87–88 and accompanying text (“[I]n practice, 
courts review agency interpretations of their own regulations under a standard nearly identical to 
that at Chevron step two.”). 
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Seminole Rock deference as initially applied, rather than as interpreted by 
Tallman and Auer. 
2.  Kisor is Consistent with the APA’s Judicial Review Provisions 
Since the APA Does Not Exclusively Require De Novo Review of 
Agency Decisions. 
Kisor comports with the degree of deference Congress intended when it 
enacted the Administrative Procedure Act.  Judicial deference to agency 
expertise began well before enactment of the APA.245  As the administrative 
state expanded, courts progressively began adopting a more deferential 
attitude towards agency findings.246  During the New Deal and World War II 
era, courts recognized and applied varying degrees of deference when 
reviewing agency findings of law as well as fact.247  Since the APA was 
expressly intended to “restate[] the present law as to the scope of judicial 
review,” that scope encapsulated some degree of judicial deference.248 
Despite Justice Gorsuch’s contentions, section 706 does not mandate de 
novo review.249  Section 706 requires reviewing courts to “decide all relevant 
questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and 
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action,”250  
The section’s broad framing gives a judge discretion in how to decide such 
legal questions.251  Justice Gorsuch’s argument uses an unduly narrow 
construction of section 706 that mischaracterizes deference’s central legal 
question and proceeds under a false premise.252  Section 706 permits two 
types of review: de novo review and “reading for reasonableness” review.253  
The Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedures stated:  
 
 245.  See supra Sections II.A–B. 
 246.  See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text; see also John J. Coughlin, The History of 
the Judicial Review of Administrative Power and the Future of Regulatory Governance, 38 IDAHO 
L. REV. 89, 110 (2001) (“While the Supreme Court was firmly committed to the availability of 
judicial review of agency actions to individuals who incurred injury to a legal right, the limited 
scope of the review permitted the administrative agencies wide latitude.”). 
 247.  See e.g., Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publ’ns, 311 U.S. 111, 130–31 (1944) (stating 
that questions of statutory interpretation are appropriate, so long as courts “giv[e] appropriate weight 
to the judgment of those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute”). 
 248.  ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 61, at 108. 
 249.  See supra notes 198–200.  
  250.  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018).  
 251.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1642 (2019) (“The APA does 
not say whether and when courts should defer to agency interpretations of law.”). 
 252.  Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2433 (2019) (arguing that the APA’s silence on whether 
to defer when interpreting regulations suggests that “Congress told courts to ‘determine’ those 
matters for themselves”).  But see The Honorable Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 514 (1989) (“[O]ne provision of the 
[APA] itself seems to have been based upon the quite mistaken assumption that questions of law 
would always be decided de novo by the courts.”). 
 253.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2419.  
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Even on questions of law [independent judicial] judgment seems 
not to be compelled.  The question of statutory interpretation might 
be approached by the court de novo and given the answer which 
the court thinks to be the “right interpretation.”  Or the court might 
approach it, somewhat as a question of fact, to ascertain, not the 
“right interpretation,” but only whether the administrative 
interpretation has substantial support.254 
“Substantial support” means “reasonableness review.”255  Thus, the 
legal question central to Chevron deference—whether an agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable—is fully permissible, despite the fact that 
Chevron seems to eschew de novo review.256  With Chevron deference, the 
legal question concerns whether Congress has delegated interpretive 
authority to the administrative agency; an affirmative finding triggers 
reasonableness review.257  Similarly, Kisor’s reasonableness review was 
triggered by the Court’s evaluation as to “whether the character and context 
of the agency interpretation entitles it to controlling weight.”258  Just as in 
Chevron, whether an agency’s interpretation of a regulation is entitled to 
deference under Kisor is a question of law fully within the scope of review 
intended by section 706 of the APA.259  
Ultimately, the Court appropriately responded to the criticism that Auer 
was divorced from its precedent by establishing a framework for deference 
that more closely tracks Seminole Rock’s inquiry.  Since Congress intended 
to restate the law of judicial review to agency actions in the APA,260 Kisor’s 
reasonableness review comports with the degree of deference intended by the 
APA. 
 
 254.  S. DOC. NO. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 90–91 (1941). 
 255. See Sunstein, supra note 251, at 1647–48 (explaining how the APA’s drafters suggested 
courts might accept an agency’s interpretation as long as it is reasonable, even if it is not the best 
interpretation). 
 256.  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) 
(“[L]egislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.”); see also Sunstein, supra note 251, at 1646–47 (describing the 
similarities between the Committee’s explanation of the APA’s scope of judicial review and 
Chevron). 
 257.  See JERRY L. MASHAW, REASONED ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY: 
HOW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SUPPORTS DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 29 (2018) (explaining how 
Chevron deference comports with section 706 of the APA). 
 258.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416. 
 259.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 
2104–05 (1990) (“The reasonableness inquiry should probably be seen as similar to the inquiry into 
whether the agency’s decision is ‘arbitrary’ or ‘capricious’ within the meaning of the APA.”); see 
also Angstreich, supra note 230, at 86 (explaining the similarities between Chevron and Seminole 
Rock). 
 260.  See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL, supra note 61, at 108. 
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B.  Kisor’s Heightened Judicial Scrutiny Redresses Constitutional 
Concerns Undergirding Auer’s Criticisms 
Unlike the judiciary’s limited inquiry under Auer, Kisor’s framework 
mandates independent judicial inquiry into a regulation’s meaning.  This 
framework effectively addresses the criticism that deference infringes on the 
Constitution’s guarantee of an impartial judgment to those before the court.261  
Active judicial scrutiny also remedies the separation of powers concerns of 
Auer deference’s critics by narrowing the circumstances in which deference 
applies, thereby granting the judge greater discretion in determining whether 
an interpretation is reasonable or not.262 
1.  Kisor Mitigates Due Process Concerns by Requiring More Active 
Judicial Scrutiny of an Ambiguous Regulation 
Kisor’s framework rebuts Justice Gorsuch’s chief criticism that 
deference infringes on the judge’s responsibility “to say what the law is.”263  
By requiring the judge to exhaust the interpretative toolkit and find a 
“genuine ambiguity” before deferring, Kisor mandates that the judge 
construe the text independently from the agency’s reading and grants the 
judge a degree of independence absent in Auer.264 
Kisor’s high standard for ambiguity affords judges great leeway in 
deciding whether deference is owed.265  If the judge agrees that the agency’s 
reading is the “best reading” of the statute, deference is appropriate.266  But, 
if the judge disagrees, Kisor provides the judge greater freedom to avoid a 
result that may be contrary to the law’s intended meaning.267  Kisor’s 
framework and limitations prohibit a judge from engaging in the very sort of 
 
 261.  See infra Section IV.B.1. 
 262.  See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 263.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2440 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment) (explaining that Auer “seeks to coopt the judicial power by 
requiring an Article III judge to decide a case before him according to principles that he believes do 
not accurately reflect the law” (emphasis in original)); see also Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 
135 S. Ct. 1199, 1219 (2015) (“Seminole Rock deference . . . precludes judges from independently 
determining [the meaning of the law].”); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 618 (2013) 
(explaining that the aim of interpretation is “[n]ot to make policy, but to determine what policy has 
been made”). 
 264.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (explaining that the Court’s application of Auer transformed 
Seminole Rock deference into a more “reflexive” doctrine and that “a court must ‘carefully 
consider[]’ the text, structure, history, and purpose of a regulation, in all the ways it would if it had 
no agency to fall back on” (alteration in original)). 
 265.  Id. (“[A] court cannot wave the ambiguity flag just because it found the regulation 
impenetrable on the first read.”).  
 266.  Id. at 2416–18. 
 267.  Id. at 2418 (“[T]his Court has cabined Auer’s scope in varied and critical ways—and in 
exactly that measure, has maintained a strong judicial role in interpreting rules.”); see id. at 2442 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment) (advocating for “redirecting the judge’s interpretative task 
back to its roots” to ensure proper scrutiny over the law). 
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mechanical application of deference that underlies the Court’s conservatives’ 
concerns.268  Ultimately, the active judicial scrutiny mandated in Kisor 
remedies Justice Gorsuch’s concern that Auer removes the judge from their 
Article III role and infringes on the legal process the Constitution guarantees 
to litigants.269 
2.  Kisor’s Heightened Judicial Scrutiny Mitigates Separation of 
Powers Issues 
In light of the criticism that Auer deference permits an agency to 
interpret its own rules, Kisor created a heightened judicial scrutiny that 
mitigated such concerns for three reasons.270  First, unlike Auer’s broad and 
highly deferential framework, Kisor still requires a judge to exercise their 
independent judgment when construing a statute.271  Applying Kisor 
necessarily precludes the type of mechanical, “hands-off” jurisprudence that 
arguably aggrandized agency power at the judiciary’s expense.272   
Second, Auer’s criticisms are rooted in a false premise: that Auer 
deference leads agencies to circumvent notice-and-comment rulemaking by 
issuing vague regulations supplemented by guidance documents exempt 
from APA procedural requirements.273  Implied in this “self-delegation” 
argument is an inherent suspicion and skepticism of agencies and their 
experts.274  Yet, as Justice Kagan rightly notes, “no real evidence backs up” 
 
 268.  Id. at 2421 (majority opinion) (explaining that Kisor’s limitations ensure that “courts retain 
a firm grip on the interpretive function”). 
 269.  Article III charges the judiciary with resolving civil cases and controversies arising under 
the laws of the United States, thus the Constitution entitles those before the courts review by a body 
separate from the political branches.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 270.  See, e.g., Talk America, Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68 (2011) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment) (“It seems contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to 
permit the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.”). 
 271.  Compare Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (stating that “a court must ‘carefully consider’ the text, 
structure, history, and purpose of a regulation” before determining it is ambiguous), with Auer v. 
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (“Because the salary-basis test is a creature of the Secretary’s 
own regulations, his interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling unless ‘plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens 
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989))). 
 272.  Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1220 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in judgment) (arguing that Seminole Rock deference “undermines the judicial ‘check’ on the 
political branches”). 
 273.  See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2440–41 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judment) (arguing that an 
“agency’s failure to write a clear regulation winds up increasing its power, allowing it to both write 
and interpret rules that bear the force of law”); see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 
597, 620 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining how Auer deference encourages agencies to 
circumvent notice-and-comment procedures by issuing vaguely framed regulations intended to be 
subsequently fleshed out by issuing interpretations (citing Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court 
and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 11–12 (1996))). 
 274.  See Manning, supra note 238, at 655–56 (arguing “an agency’s right of self-interpretation 
should have an untoward effect upon its incentive to speak precisely and transparently when it 
promulgates regulations”). 
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such an assertion.275  Further, agencies have an active interest in writing clear 
regulations.276  Ambiguity is a threat to the long-term legitimacy of the 
regulatory scheme and frustrates effective agency administration.277 
Third, the “self-delegation” argument ignores the fact that agencies are 
merely clarifying already established legislative rules when they issue 
guidance documents.278  In drafting guidance documents, an agency is 
engaging in an extension of its delegated authority for crafting regulations, 
rather than “enlarg[ing] its own power” by interpreting what it previously 
wrote.279  Precise and specific regulations are costly to adopt and enforce.280  
Further, agencies may not be able to anticipate every circumstance in which 
a rule is applied.281  The ability to issue subsequent interpretations to 
established regulations provides agencies with much needed flexibility in 
navigating the tradeoffs between costs, clarity, and congruence.282  An 
agency’s ability to adopt a rule due to an unforeseen circumstance is 
necessarily implied in an agency’s delegated authority, as doing so is required 
in their exercise of the “executive Power”283 and responsibility in “executing 
a statutory plan.”284  Agencies have broad discretion regarding the procedures 
 
 275.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2407; see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable 
Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 308 n.45 (2017) (describing how an analysis of over 
2000 rules did not uncover any evidence of them being written intentionally ambiguous). 
 276.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2421 (explaining how vagueness increases the likelihood a rule may 
be overturned and makes established rules more susceptible to reinterpretation by “future 
administrations, with different views”); see also Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 275, at 308–09 
(stating that both internal and external pressures compel clarity in regulations). 
 277.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2421; see also Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 275, at 309 (explaining 
how “Auer actually incentivizes clarity” because “[i]f an agency leaves a regulation ambiguous, 
[then the agency] cannot be certain that a subsequent interpretation will be made by an 
administration with the same or similar values”). 
 278.  See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 275, at 313 (“When an agency makes valid legislative 
rules, those rules bind the agency itself as well as all the world.”). 
 279.  Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 620 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
omitted); see also Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 275, at 313–14 (“In the standard Auer case, 
there is nothing at all arbitrary about the agency’s decision to specify, through interpretation, what 
a legislative rule means, not least because the agency is often answering a question that it did not 
anticipate.”). 
 280.  See Angstreich, supra note 230, at 114 (“When a regulation is specified in great detail it 
can become difficult to identify the applicable regulatory subprovision and, therefore, more costly 
to enforce and less likely to induce compliance.  Increased clarity also adds to the costs of 
promulgating the rule.”). 
 281.  See Cass Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 993 (1995) (“Those who 
issue a rule cannot know the full range of situations to which the rule will be applied, and in the new 
circumstances, the rule may be hopelessly outmoded.”). 
 282.  See Angstreich, supra note 230, at 114–15 (explaining the comparative advantages of 
vague and precise rules, and arguing that Seminole Rock deference does little to incentivize an 
agency’s choice between vagueness and precision). 
 283.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 569 U.S. 290, 
305, n.4 (2013) . 
 284.  Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422 (2019); see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 229 (2001) (“[I]t can still be apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority . . . that 
Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses 
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used to implement regulations within their statutory authority.285  
Accordingly, the decision whether to interpret the meaning of a regulation 
through a guidance document, rather than promulgate an entirely new rule, is 
a procedural decision about how to answer an unforeseen question under the 
current statutory scheme.286 
Kisor departs from Auer’s mechanical application by conditioning 
deference on a judge’s independent inquiry into the reasonableness of an 
interpretation.287  Kisor redirects the judge’s focus away from the agency’s 
interpretation and towards the text of the regulation, thereby granting litigants 
the process guaranteed in the Constitution and limiting the potential 
aggrandizement of agency power. 
C.  Kisor’s Double-Edged Sword: Defending Expert Agencies While 
Providing the Framework for Their Erosion. 
Kisor seems to exalt the administrative state’s institutional 
competencies and bolster arguments justifying the reasons to vest 
interpretative authority with the expert agencies.288  Yet, Kisor provides a 
framework for the Court to import future restrictions onto Chevron, thereby 
eroding the administrative state’s effectiveness and authority.289  Though it is 
unlikely a majority on the Court would vote to abrogate Chevron given its 
longevity as precedent, Kisor suggests that, should Chevron be revisited, the 
Court likely would further narrow and limit the doctrine’s applicability.290 
 
ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law . . . .”); Martin v. Occupational Safety & 
Health Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 153 (1991) (“[W]e presume here that Congress intended to invest 
interpretative power in the administrative actor in the best position to develop [regulatory 
standards].”); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) (“The power of an administrative agency 
to administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy 
and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”); see also City of 
Arlington, 539 U.S. at 327 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“An agency’s interpretive authority, entitling 
the agency to judicial deference, acquires its legitimacy from a delegation of lawmaking power from 
Congress to the Executive.”). 
 285.  See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp. (“Chenery II”), 332 U.S. 194, 201–03 (1947) 
(“[A]n administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order.  
To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity.”). 
 286.  Agencies should have flexibility in deciding which tools are best suited to resolve 
unforeseen problems related to rules they issue.  Given that such procedural decisions—determining 
which tools to use— are context dependent, the Court recognizes that such decisions are best left to 
agency discretion.  See, e.g., Nat’l. Labor Relations Bd. v. Bell Aerospace CO. Div. of Textron, 
Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 291–94 (1974) (explaining how procedural decisions, such as whether to 
“announc[e] new principles” through rulemaking or adjudication, are discretionary and warrant 
deference); Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 275, at 313–14 (arguing that an agency’s procedural 
decisions do not alter the boundaries of their authority). 
 287.  See supra Section II.D. 
 288.  See infra Section IV.C.1. 
 289.  See infra Section IV.C.2. 
 290.  See infra Section IV.C.3. 
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1.  The Institutional Competencies of Administrative Agencies Make 
Them Better Positioned to Clarify Regulatory Ambiguities. 
Both Congress and the courts have recognized the pragmatism of letting 
the agencies clarify ambiguities in the statutes and regulations that they 
administer.291  Agencies’ subject matter expertise, fact-finding abilities, 
familiarity with policy goals, and experience in implementing and enforcing 
regulations underlie the appropriateness of judicial deference.292  Vesting 
agency actors with implementation responsibilities ensures that the laws are 
administered in an effective and consistent manner.293  Congress intended 
agencies to fulfil the responsibility of fleshing out congressional commands 
and developing them into regulations that serve Congress’s legislative 
aims.294  As the Court noted in Mead, an agency’s “conferred authority” 
suggests that “Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the 
force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the 
enacted law.”295  An agency’s experience with implementing and enforcing 
its regulations provides greater expertise when resolving regulatory 
ambiguities.  The Court has justified deference based on an agency’s 
exclusive responsibility of enacting and implementing its regulations.296  
 
 291.  See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (explaining “that 
Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses 
ambiguity in the statute”). 
 292.  See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 150–51 (1991) 
(“Because applying an agency’s regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the 
agency’s unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives, we presume that the power 
authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the agency’s delegated lawmaking 
powers.”); see MASHAW, supra note 257, at 131 (explaining how an agency’s scientific and 
technical expertise and experience in “implementing broad goals in heterogeneous contexts and in 
consultation with diverse interested parties and institutions” is central to Chevron’s “insistence” on 
deference). 
 293.  See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (“This broad deference 
is all the more warranted when . . . the regulation concerns ‘a complex and highly technical 
regulatory program.’” (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991))); Ford 
Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980) (“[L]anguage in the legislative history 
evinces a decided preference for resolving interpretive issues by uniform administrative decision, 
rather than piecemeal through litigation.”). 
 294.  See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2413 (2019) (“[T]he presumption that Congress 
intended Auer deference stems from the awareness that resolving genuine regulatory ambiguities 
often ‘entail[s] the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns.’” (quoting Thomas Jefferson 
Univ., 512 U.S. at 512)); Martin, 499 U.S. at 153 (finding that “historical familiarity and 
policymaking expertise” suggest a presumption “that Congress delegates interpretative lawmaking 
power to the agency rather than to the reviewing court”); Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v. Pottsville 
Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 146 (1940) (“Congress which creates and sustains these agencies must 
be trusted to correct whatever defects experience may reveal.”); see also LANDIS, supra note 1,  at 
70 (“Despite the outcry from time to time by individual members of the Congress against the grant 
of powers to the administrative to formulate regulatory provisions, on the whole that process today 
has the respect of members of the legislative branch . . . .”). 
 295.  Mead, 533 U.S. at 229. 
 296. See, e.g., Martin, 499 U.S. at 152 (explaining that the Secretary of Labor’s experience in 
enforcing the Occupational Safety and Health Act underlies the presumption that Congress intended 
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Further, the Court has long acknowledged that agencies are best equipped to 
resolve statutory ambiguities because of their experience in administering 
regulations.297  Granting agencies interpretive authority allows for 
consistency in the regulatory scheme and provides clearer notice to those 
subject to the regulations. 
Justice Gorsuch’s contention that judges are “capable of producing a 
single, uniform, and stable interpretation” contravenes the practical 
understanding that “judges are most likely to come to divergent conclusions 
when they are least likely to know what they are doing.”298  Unless the judge 
is an expert in the subject matter, the best interpretation of an ambiguity likely 
stems from the most knowledgeable authority.299  Deferring to the agency’s 
expertise is not an abdication of judicial responsibility, but rather a pragmatic 
understanding that proper administration of the law necessarily involves 
adjusting to the judiciary’s limited competencies to ensure that the law 
functions as Congress intended.300 
Justice Kagan appropriately recognized that the policymaking 
responsibilities and expertise delegated to agencies justifies deference.  The 
effectiveness of a regulatory scheme depends on an agency’s regulations 
being clear and long-lasting, yet the executive branch’s responsiveness to the 
electorate requires agencies to have a degree of flexibility in how these 
schemes are administered.301  An agency’s expertise in the subject of a statute 
informs its ability to adopt regulations to changing political tides or to adapt 
 
the Secretary to have interpretative power); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded 
to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.”); Nat’l 
Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944) (“Everyday experience in the 
administration of the statute gives [an agency] familiarity with the circumstances and backgrounds 
of employment relationships in various industries . . . .   The experience thus acquired must be 
brought frequently to bear on the question who is an employee under the Act.”) 
 297.  See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (justifying deference to agency interpretations “given the 
‘specialized experience and broader investigations and information’ available to the agency” and 
the importance of uniformity in a regulation’s meaning and application (quoting Skidmore v. Swift, 
323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944))); see also Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 (1941) (“Where, as here, a 
determination has been left to an administrative body, this delegation will be respected and the 
administrative conclusion left untouched.”). 
 298.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2443 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 2414 (majority 
opinion). 
 299.  Banks Miller & Brett Curry, Experts Judging Experts: The Role of Expertise in Reviewing 
Agency Decision Making, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 55, 69 (2013) (concluding “that subject matter 
expertise makes federal appellate judges significantly less likely to defer to an agency than their 
nonexpert peers”). 
 300.  See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 275, at 320 (“Because of the need to resolve technical 
issues, and because of the plain advantages of accountability, the balance cuts hard in the direction 
of Auer.”). 
 301.  See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2413; see also MASHAW, supra note 257, at 173–74 (arguing that 
delegating to agencies the responsibility to make choices based on facts and circumstances that are 
unavailable to Congress is a policy choice). 
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a statute to changing factual circumstances.302  By noting the judiciary’s 
limitations as a generalist branch whose policymaking responsibilities are 
restrained by the separation of powers doctrine, Justice Kagan grounds her 
reasoning in the pragmatic understanding that the judiciary’s limited 
competencies and expertise justify trusting the experts.303 
2.  Kisor’s Framework Indicates How the Court May Further 
Narrow Deference Doctrine 
Though Kisor’s framework is identical to Chevron’s, the express 
limitations on its applicability make the doctrine far narrower.  The markers 
provided to guide a court’s reasonableness review limit the circumstances in 
which deference may be granted.304  Since Kisor heightens the burden for an 
agency seeking deference, the markers serve the purpose of ensuring that the 
agency not only acted in accordance with its delegated authority, but that it 
acted reasonably and consistently.305  While Chevron has been modified in 
order to ensure that Congress intended to vest interpretive authority in an 
agency, its reasonableness prong still remains somewhat broad.306   
Accordingly, applying Kisor’s guideposts to Chevron would narrow the 
deference doctrine by restraining the broadness of Chevron’s reasonableness 
review.  In turn, judges would have far greater discretion in deciding whether 
Chevron applies.  As will be discussed in Section IV.C.3, the Court’s current 
composition suggests that it is interested in reconsidering Chevron.  Should 
it choose to do so, Kisor’s limits provide a means to narrow the doctrine 
without eliminating it. 
3.  Kagan’s Caution and Conservative Skepticism Render 
Deference’s Future Unsettled and Bleak 
Despite Justice Kagan’s rosy view of agency expertise, the majority 
opinion cautions courts from relying on agency expertise.  Her opinion 
 
 302.  See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2413; Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (explaining that since agencies are politically accountable under the executive 
branch, it is appropriate for them to make policy choices that Congress either implicitly or explicitly 
left for the agency to resolve). 
 303.  See MASHAW, supra note 257, at 124–31 (explaining how agency expertise and political 
accountability underpin the reasoning in favor of agency deference). 
 304.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416. 
 305.  See O’Leske, supra note 242, 275–85 (proposing four context-dependent factors to 
determine whether deference is owed similar to those subsequently established in Kisor and arguing 
such an approach would reduce “incentive[s] to promulgate vague regulations,” diminish 
“opportunit[ies] to re-interpret a regulation routinely without adequate notice,” and “promote much-
needed certainty for the public”). 
 306.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Chevron sets forth an across-the-board presumption, which operates as a background rule of law 
against which Congress legislates. . . .   Any resolution of the ambiguity by the administering agency 
that is authoritative . . .  must be accepted by the courts if it is reasonable.” (emphasis added)). 
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weighs deference’s practicality against the judiciary’s ability “to perform 
their reviewing and restraining functions.”307  In pronouncing Auer’s limits, 
Justice Kagan lends credence to the arguments of those fearful and suspicious 
of the administrative state.308  Kisor’s requirement that an interpretation must 
“emanate” from those tasked with the ability “to make authoritative policy in 
the relevant context” suggests that, without such limits, any agency 
decisionmaker could essentially make binding law.309  Though, on the 
surface, such a limit is absolutely reasonable, it begs the question as to who 
decides whether an agency actor has such authority: the agency or the judge?  
By tasking the judge to resolve this question, Kisor implies a degree of 
distrust in an agency’s decision to internally delegate its vested authority.310 
Further, inherent in Justice Kagan’s admission that “the administrative 
realm is vast and varied,” is a suspicion of bureaucracy.311  Accordingly, the 
“character and context” limit suggests that not all reasonable interpretations 
are contextually appropriate.312  Yet, if an agency is best positioned for 
interpreting and administering its statutory scheme, would it not know 
whether, under certain circumstances, Congress presumed its interpretations 
to warrant some degree of deference?313  
Ultimately, the tension in Justice Kagan’s opinion between deference 
and oversight not only reflects her cautious view of the administrative state 
but also results in a compromise that does little to prevent future efforts to 
undermine the administrative state.   
While Justice Gorsuch has been particularly vocal in calling for the 
abrogation of deference doctrine entirely, his conservative colleagues have 
 
 307.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415. 
 308.  Id. at 2418.  
 309.  Id. at 2416; see Adrian Vermeule, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe, and Kagan on 
the Administrative State, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2481 (2017) (describing how Justice Kagan’s 
view of administrative legitimacy establishes the President “as a nationally elected check on the ills 
of bureaucracy”); see also Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. 
L. REV. 2118, 2151 (2016) (describing how agency decisionmakers can use Chevron to pursue their 
own policy goals). 
 310.  The expansive scope of the administrative state and its oversight difficulties increases the 
likelihood for abuses of power and illegitimate action.  See Justice Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2264 (2001) (“[M]odels of administration . . .  relying on 
internal expertise provoke serious questions about the quality, no less than the legitimacy, of agency 
action.” (emphasis added)); Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 Nw. U.L. Rev. 673, 
677 (2015) (arguing that the size of the administrative state and difficulty in enforcement “ensure 
that some positive rate of abuse is inevitable”). 
 311.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416. 
 312.  Kisor narrowly defines “character and context” by requiring that an interpretation be a “fair 
and reasoned,” “official” position on a matter within an agency’s designated substantive expertise.  
Id. at 2416–17. 
 313.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (“[I]t can still be apparent from 
the agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would 
expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity. . . .”); see 
also LANDIS, supra note 1, at 61 (explaining that agencies are “dependent on the legislative and 
executive for an extension of [their] existing powers” if circumstances so require). 
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signaled a willingness to consider the issue.314  Justice Thomas likely would 
join Justice Gorsuch in eliminating Chevron entirely, as evidenced by his 
concurrence in Michigan v. EPA.315  Justice Kavanaugh’s writings on 
Chevron indicate that he also favors overturning Chevron.  Like his 
conservative colleagues, Justice Kavanaugh has argued that judicial 
deference poses separation of powers concerns.316  However, his view of the 
doctrine is somewhat more nuanced than that of Justices Gorsuch and 
Thomas.  Justice Kavanaugh has suggested that there are two circumstances 
where deference “makes a lot of sense:”317 first, where the statute explicitly 
delegates interpretive authority to the agency; and second, where a statute 
“uses broad, open-ended terms like ‘reasonable,’ ‘appropriate,’ ‘feasible,’ or 
‘practicable.’”318  Considering how Kisor’s limits could be applied to 
Chevron, Justice Kavanaugh would likely be open to restraining the doctrine, 
but in a manner where its application is so circumscribed that it would be 
rendered functionally null.319 
Chief Justice Roberts, though unlikely to join in an opinion which 
abrogates Chevron, seems to be open to revisiting and narrowing the 
doctrine.320  His recently developed “major questions doctrine” has already 
narrowed the circumstances where deference may apply.321  His dissent in 
 
 314.  See Matthew C. Turk & Karen E. Woody, Justice Kavanaugh, Lorenzo v. SEC, and the 
Post-Kennedy Supreme Court, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 193, 246–49 (2019) (arguing that while Justices 
Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Thomas seek to eliminate Chevron, Justices Breyer, Roberts, and Alito 
favor retaining, but limiting the doctrine). 
 315.  135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J. concurring) (arguing that Chevron deference’s 
“transfer” of interpretative authority “is in tension with Article III’s Vesting Clause”); see also Perez 
v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 1213–15 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) 
(lambasting the Court’s tradition of deference and concluding that, while stare decisis is essential 
to the legal system’s stability, “stare decisis is only an ‘adjunct’ of our duty as judges to decide by 
our best lights what the Constitution means” (quoting McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 812 
(2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)))). 
 316.  The Honorable Brett M. Kavanaugh, The Role of the Judiciary in Maintaining the 
Separation of Powers, HERITAGE FOUND. LECTURE, 8–9, (Oct. 25, 2017) 
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-02/HL1284.pdf (arguing that Chevron’s 
indeterminacy is “antithetical to the neutral, impartial rule of law”). 
 317.  Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2152 
(2016). 
 318.  Id. at 2153–54.  In these cases, Justice Kavanaugh suggests the standard of review for 
deference is functionally equivalent to arbitrary and capricious review.  Id.; see Motor Vehicles 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (holding that the arbitrary and capricious standard 
concerns whether the agency considered the relevant factors and whether it made a “clear error of 
judgment” and requires the agency to consider the relevant data and provide a “rational connection 
between the facts found and the choices made”). 
 319.  See Turk & Woody, supra note 314, at 248 (explaining that Justice Kavanaugh likely 
favors either overturning Chevron or “redefining its holding out of existence”). 
 320.  See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (recognizing that stare decisis warranted 
upholding Auer yet addressing the similarities between Skidmore and Auer’s newly cabined scope). 
 321.  See Turk & Woody, supra note 314, at 247 (noting that the “major questions doctrine” 
“carves out an exception to Chevron” in cases where ambiguous statutory language “raise[s] legal 
questions of great importance”). 
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City of Arlington v. Federal Communications Commission322 indicates limits 
on the scope of deference.323  And though the Chief Justice joined Justice 
Kagan in retaining but limiting Auer, his refusal to join in her policy and 
presumption arguments indicates an underlying skepticism of the Court’s 
precedent of agency-centric deference.  Chief Justice Roberts indicated there 
are circumstances where refusing to defer to the agency’s interpretation 
would be unreasonable.324  The Chief Justice alludes to deference’s effect as 
a check against erroneous and politically-motivated interpretations which 
could hamper the effectiveness of a regulatory scheme.325  Further, Chief 
Justice Roberts’ suggestion that “the distance between [Justice Kagan] and 
Justice Gorsuch is not as great as it may initially appear” suggests a more 
conservative approach to deference.326  Given the overlap between Skidmore 
and Kisor, Chief Justice Roberts implies that narrowing Chevron could 
square adherence to Chevron’s precedent with Justice Gorsuch’s Skidmore-
only jurisprudence.327 
Justice Alito’s view is a bit more enigmatic.  While Justice Alito’s prior 
record reflects the view that Chevron is binding precedent,328 his abstention 
from joining parts IV and V of Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence and his joining 
in Chief Roberts’ City of Arlington dissent indicates his support for further 
limiting deference.329  
Ultimately, with only three Justices clearly in favor of formally 
eliminating Chevron, it is probable that deference doctrine survives the 
Roberts Court.  Given the narrowing effect of applying Kisor’s framework to 
Chevron, it is more likely that a majority of the Court would adopt limits 
similar to Kisor in the future, thus rendering Chevron far more docile and 
ineffective.  Given recent efforts to circumscribe the administrative state, 
such limitations would further diminish the administrative state’s 
 
  322.  569 U.S. 290 (2013). 
 323.  Id. at 312 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“An agency cannot exercise interpretive authority 
until it has it . . . .   [W]hether an agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a court, without 
deference to the agency.”). 
 324.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 325.  See Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Cristopher J. Walker, Administrative Law’s 
Political Dynamics, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1506 (2018) (concluding empirical evidence supports 
“that Chevron deference appears to significantly constrain judges’ political behavior” in reviewing 
statutory interpretations). 
 326.  Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2424. 
 327.  Id. 
 328.  See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2129 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that 
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institutional credibility.330  In turn, this would hinder the ability of agencies 
to act pursuant to their constitutionally delegated authority.331  Moreover, 
jurisdictional inconsistencies resulting from enhanced judicial discretion 
would frustrate the predictability that notice-and-comment rulemaking 
provides to regulated parties.332  Further, limiting Chevron would erode an 
important check on ideological judicial behavior,333 with potentially 
devastating implications for environmental, labor, and civil rights 
regulations.334  While Justice Gorsuch is correct in noting that we once 
survived in a “world without Chevron,”335 Chevron is now a cornerstone of 
the modern regulatory apparatus.  By continuing to chip away at the doctrine, 
the Court risks collapsing the entire administrative state. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Kisor, the Court correctly decided to retain and reinforce Auer 
deference.  In so doing, the Court realigned Auer to be more consistent with 
Seminole Rock’s historic precedent.336  As a result, Kisor provides redress to 
concerns about the constitutionality of deferring to an agency’s 
interpretations of its own rules by establishing limitations on its application 
that enhance the judge’s role and discretion.337  Yet, while Kisor justifies 
deference’s practicality and bolsters the presumption that Congress intended 
for deference, Justice Kagan’s opinion provides a more cautious approach 
and suggests an underlying distrust of the administrative state.338  Ultimately, 
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Kisor establishes limitations that, if applied to Chevron, would narrow the 
Court’s deference doctrine even further.339  Though it is unlikely the Court 
will eliminate agency deference entirely, Kisor is precursor for the further 
erosion of agency deference and a bleak prognosis for deference doctrine’s 
vitality. 340 
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